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ABSTRACT 
         A large legal and economic literature describes how state-owned enterprises (SOEs) suffer 
from a variety of agency and political problems. Less theory and evidence, however, have been 
generated about the reasons why state-owned enterprises listed in stock markets manage to 
attract investors to buy their shares (and bonds). In this Article, we examine this apparent puzzle 
and develop a theory of how legal and extralegal constraints allow mixed enterprises to solve 
some of these problems. We then use three detailed case studies of state-owned oil companies – 
Brazil’s Petrobras, Norway’s Statoil, and Mexico’s Pemex – to examine how our theory fares in 
practice. Overall, we show how mixed enterprises have made progress to solve some of their 
agency problems, even as government intervention persists as the biggest threat to private 
minority shareholders in these firms. 
																																																								
* We thank the useful research assistance by Claudia Bruschi, Alexandre Caraccio and Thiago Reis. 	
	
 
No two characters seem more inconsistent than those of trader and sovereign. 
If the trading spirit of the English East India Company renders them very bad 
sovereigns, the spirit of sovereignty seems to have rendered them equally bad 
traders. 
 
Adam Smith, Book V: On the Revenue of the Sovereign or Commonwealth 
 
 
Introduction 
 
  State ownership of enterprise has long had its foes, who blame it for evils 
ranging from operational inefficiency to outright corruption. It has, nonetheless, proved 
to be quite resilient. The wave of privatizations that swept the world in the last decades 
has reduced but not eliminated government shareholdings in business corporations. 
State-owned enterprises (SOEs) are a fixture of the variety of capitalism embraced by 
today’s BRICs – Brazil, Russia, India, and China – as well as other emerging 
economies. In the aftermath of the global financial crisis, the Leviathan as shareholder 
temporarily reemerged even in previously inhospitable contexts, as evidenced by the 
large-scale bail-outs of failing financial firms and auto companies in the United States.
1  
 
  The state, however, is too often not alone in the companies it controls. Mixed 
corporations – here defined as firms in which the government controls the firm but 
shares ownership with private investors – are pervasive around the globe, and have been 
on the rise in a number of jurisdictions, most conspicuously China.
2 The privatizations 
of the 1980s and 1990s were often partial in nature, with the result that the incidence of 
mixed enterprises effectively increased in some contexts after the state’s divestitures.
3 
Not less important, many mixed enterprises are configured as listed firms where private 
investors hold minority shareholdings. As of 2010, publicly traded SOEs accounted for 
a startling one-fifth of the world market capitalization.
4  
 
  The coexistence of government and private stockholdings in business 
corporations is puzzling, and has long baffled observers. The potential for conflicts of 
interest between private and government shareholders is evident: while private investors 
																																																								
1 To be sure, the U.S. Treasury assumed in these cases the transient role of what President Obama called a 
“reluctant shareholder,” and divestitures are by now well underway.  
2 An OECD survey estimates that, in the mid-2000, SOEs still accounted for about 50% of the market 
capitalization of some member countries. CORPORATE GOVERNANCE OF STATE-OWNED ENTERPRISES: A 
SURVEY OF OECD  COUNTRIES  13  (2005).  According to a recent estimate, SOEs still account for 
approximately 80% of the stock market value in Russia, 60% in China, and 35% in Brazil. The Company 
that Ruled the Waves, THE ECONOMIST, Dec. 17, 2011, at 109.  
3 Bernardo Bortolotti & Mara Faccio, Government Control of Privatized Firms, 22 REV. FIN. STUD. 2907, 
2907 (2009) (“[a]t the end of 2000, after the largest privatization wave in history, governments retained 
control of 62.4% of privatized firms”). 
4 China Buys Up the World, THE ECONOMIST, Nov. 13, 2010, at 11.  	
	
presumably seek to maximize the financial returns on their stock,
5 the government also 
has political objectives to fulfill – be they either benign (serving the public good) or 
malign (the product of rent-seeking). This tension has at times seemed intractable: in the 
mid-twentieth century, prominent French jurist George Ripert expressed a somber view 
of the conflicts inherent in mixed enterprises. The law, he argued, could not possibly 
manage to “reconcile the irreconcilable.”
6 In the same vein, various commentators have 
long forecasted the eclipse of mixed enterprise, and the ensuing convergence to either 
wholly public or wholly private modes of ownership and governance.
7   
 
Yet, defying predictions, this strange combination of state and private capital has 
not only persisted but has also appeared to thrive. China’s blueprint for economic 
modernization included the massive floating of minority stock in government-owned 
firms on local and foreign stock exchanges.
8 Following a combination of the global 
financial crisis and high oil prices, listed state-owned firms from emerging markets 
came to account for five out of the top ten firms in the world in market value in 2008. 
Just four years before, SOEs were missing entirely from that list, which then only 
included private firms headquartered in the U.S. and Europe.
9  
  
Despite their economic significance, mixed enterprises have been largely 
neglected by the legal and economic literature, and remain little understood. In this 
Article, we take a different approach to this theme. In lieu of expressing surprise at the 
persistence of these hybrid entities or criticizing governmental involvement in what 
could be private firms, as does most of the extant literature,
10  we inquire into the 
economic factors and institutional arrangements that make this form viable.    
																																																								
5 While this is certainly the case for the modern investor-owned corporation, historically the merchant 
shareholders in banks, utilities and insurance companies were frequently more interested in the 
company’s services than in maximizing their financial returns. See  Henry Hansmann & Mariana 
Pargendler, The Evolution of Shareholder Voting Rights: Separation of Ownership and Consumption 
(unpublished working paper, 2012) (on file with authors).  
6 GEORGES RIPERT, ASPECTS JURIDIQUE DU CAPITALISME MODERNE [Legal Aspects of Modern Capitalism] 
318 (1946) (free translation) (“[l]a loi peut tout, sauf arriver a concilier ce qui est inconciliable”).  
7 See,  e.g., Bilac Pinto, O Declínio das Sociedades de Economia Mista e o Advento das Modernas 
Empresas Públicas [The Decline of Mixed Enterprise and the Advent of the Modern Public Enterprise], in 
ESTUDOS SOBRE A CONSTITUIÇÃO BRASILEIRA (1954) (forecasting that, in light of the significant conflicts 
between state and private, mixed corporations would soon be eclipsed by wholly-owned government 
corporations).  For a recent critique of hybrid firms, see Schumpeter: The rise of the hybrid company 
(The problem with state-backed firms), THE ECONOMIST, Dec. 5, 2009 (arguing that “[t] he clearer the 
line between the state and the private sector, the better it is for those on both sides”). 
8 See, e.g., Cyril Lin, Corporatisation and Corporate Governance in China’s Economic Transition, 34 
ECONOMICS OF PLANNING 5 (2001) (describing the dominance of state-owned firms in China’s securities 
markets).  
9 Kate Burgess, OECD Scrutinises State Owned Groups, F.T., June 20, 2008 (noting that “[o]nly four 
years ago, the world’s 10 largest listed companies in terms of market value were private commercial 
entities domiciled in the US and Europe. Today, five of the top 10 publicly traded corporations are 
government controlled”). 
10 For excellent surveys, see William L. Megginson & Jeffry Netter, From State to Market: A Survey of 
Empirical Studies on Privatizations, 39 J. ECON. LIT. 321 (2001); Mary M. Shirley & Patrick Walsh, 
Public Versus Private Ownership: The Current State of the Debate (World Bank Policy Research 
Working Paper No. 2420, 2001), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=261854. 
See also notes 6 and 7 supra and accompanying text. As an exception to this trend, see Andrea Colli, 	
	
 
What explains this mode of organization? Why would the government take part 
in for-profit enterprise? Even more troubling, why would private investors agree to 
partner up with the government, when it is the majority shareholder? What role does the 
law can play in allowing the state to credibly commit to tie its hands as a controlling 
shareholder? 
 
In order to shed light on these questions, we will first introduce an analytical 
framework to address the costs and benefits of this organizational form.  One could be 
tempted to view mixed enterprises as the ultimate device for achieving the best of both 
worlds. They could, in theory, attain the efficiency of private enterprise and mitigate 
market failures in the public interest all the same time. Yet once we realistically account 
for the prospect of government failures, the story is not quite so simple. If operational 
distortions due to politically-motivated interventions are not kept in check, the benefits 
of partial private ownership might come to vanish. Conversely, if the firm were to be 
managed as a wholly private concern, the practical utility of having the government as a 
controlling shareholder would come into question.  
 
We argue that the effectiveness of mixed enterprise depends on a hybrid 
governance structure that combines elements of private ownership with public checks-
and-balances against uncertain governmental interference. This is a delicate equilibrium 
to obtain – and one not without challenges. We explore the promise and perils of this 
approach by looking at the recent experience of a sample of national oil companies 
(NOCs): Brazil’s Petrobras, Norway’s Statoil, and Mexico’s Pemex.     
 
A number of factors make oil companies a particularly interesting object of 
study for our purposes. First, NOCs are arguably the most important SOEs in the world: 
they control around 90 percent of the world’s oil reserves and 75 percent of oil and gas 
production.
11  Second, the oil industry offers the full spectrum of ownership forms and 
market structures. Among the largest oil companies, there are private, public, and mixed 
enterprises – which in turn are subject to different constraints in terms of regulation and 
competition. Third, because NOCs mediate the stream of rents governments receive 
from the exploitation of oil and gas reserves, it is in these firms that the government’s 
temptation to intervene in SOE management to pursue social goals could be greatest. 
That is, it is NOCs that governments usually want to be less transparent about how they 
manage their revenues.
12 
 
The Article proceeds as follows. Part I presents an analytical framework to 
examine mixed enterprises as an organizational form from an economic perspective. It 
																																																																																																																																																																		
Coping with the Leviathan: Minority Shareholders in State-owned Enterprises – Evidence from Italy, 
2012 BUSINESS HISTORY 1 (investigating the factors that attracted private investors to SOEs in the Italian 
context). 
11 Moreover, analysts estimate that 60 percent of the world’s undiscovered reserves are in countries in 
which NOCs are dominant players. SILVANA TORDO, BRANDON TRACY & NOORA ARFAA, NATIONAL OIL 
COMPANIES AND VALUE CREATION (2011). 
12 MICHAEL ROSS, THE OIL CURSE: HOW PETROLEUM WEALTH SHAPES THE DEVELOPMENT OF NATIONS 
(2012).  	
	
does so by comparing the costs and benefits of joint public-private ownership with its 
polar alternatives – private firms, on the one hand, and wholly-owned state enterprise, 
on the other – from the perspective of a social planner. Part II then tackles the puzzle of 
private shareholdings in SOEs, by describing the legal and extralegal mechanisms that 
encourage private actors to co-invest with the state. In Part III, we examine how these 
arrangements operate in practice by taking a closer look at the corporate governance and 
performance of three giant national oil companies: Norway’s Statoil, Brazil’s Petrobras, 
and Mexico’s Pemex.  Part IV concludes.  
 
 
I.  The economics of mixed enterprise 
 
Traditionally, the economic justification for state ownership of enterprise lies in 
the presence of a market failure.
13 Whenever one or more of the requisites for perfect 
competition are lacking, free markets no longer guarantee an efficient allocation of 
resources – with the result that, at least in theory, there could be a case for government 
ownership. This line of reasoning has over time been used to explain and justify the 
governmental provision of quintessential public services, such as roads and bridges 
(which are natural monopolies), national security (which is a public good) and 
education (an area in which positive externalities are particularly significant), to name 
only a few prominent examples. In developing countries, severe capital market failures 
also account for state ownership of capital-intensive undertakings regardless of industry 
characteristics.
14 
 
 
Conversely, critics of state intervention have drawn attention to the fact that the 
mere presence of a market failure is not, in itself, sufficient to warrant government 
ownership  of enterprises. If markets fail, so does government action,
15 for  multiple 
reasons, ranging from the difficulty in aggregating preferences through the voting 
mechanism,
16 to collective action problems and the corresponding distorted incentives 
that accompany state policy and action, leading it to favor special interest groups over 
general welfare.
17 The specter of government failure hence suggests caution at both 
about the need for state intervention and the precise contours such intervention should 
assume.  
 
Most of the economic literature favoring privatizations of SOEs focuses on one 
particular alternative to state ownership: the combination of private ownership and 
																																																								
13 See, e.g., Andrei Shleifer, State Versus Private Ownership, 34 J. ECON. PERSP. 133, 144 (1998) (“Half a 
century ago, economists were quick to favor government ownership of firms as soon as any market 
inequities or imperfections, such as monopoly power or externalities, were even suspected”).   
14 For a discussion, see Ha-Joon Chang, State-owned Enterprise Reform, in NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT 
STRATEGIES – POLICY NOTES 12 (UNDESA - United Nations Department of Social and Economic Affairs 
ed., 2008).  
15 Ronald Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J. L & ECON. 1, 18 (1960).   
16 KENNETH J. ARROW, SOCIAL CHOICE AND INDIVIDUAL VALUES (1963). 
17 See, e.g., MANCUR OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION (1965); MANCUR OLSON, THE RISE AND 
DECLINE OF NATIONS (1982). 	
	
government regulation. This approach, the theory goes, had significant advantages: 
while regulation mitigated market failures, the incentives inherent to private ownership 
helped ensure efficiency in operational performance and innovation.
18 As its very 
proponents acknowledged, however, this approach was not free from difficulties: 
whenever contracting costs were particularly severe – thus reducing the effectiveness of 
regulation – public ownership could offer a superior arrangement.
19  
 
Mixed enterprise provides another important, but mostly undertheorized, 
organizational alternative to mitigate the drawbacks of both market and government 
failures. Instead of inexorably resorting to private ownership and regulation, various 
governments around the world viewed the listing of state-owned enterprises as a 
midway solution to most of the problems associated with state ownership. As we 
explore in Part III, in the oil industry, too, there has been a visible trend towards the 
corporatization and listing of large national oil companies.
20   
 
We focus on three primary factors that make this hybrid organizational form 
potentially appealing to a social planner. The first one is its promise for regulatory 
effectiveness compared to a regime of arm’s-length regulation. In economic parlance, 
mixed enterprise differs from the standard combination of private ownership and 
government regulation in that it entails the vertical integration of the state’s regulatory 
function.
21 It economizes on the transaction costs associated with writing and enforcing 
regulations, since the government enjoys greater discretion to adapt its policies in view 
of changing circumstances through its voice within the firm’s hierarchy. This 
organizational form might be particularly fitting in environments where contracting 
institutions are weak, thus hampering the enforcement of regulations, or where non-
contractible national security or sovereignty considerations come into play.
22 
 
The advantage of regulatory effectiveness relates to the social view of SOEs.
23 
In this view, SOEs differ from private enterprise primarily due to the pursuit of a 
“double bottom-line.” That is, in addition to producing profits, state control over the 
																																																								
18 Id. at 135.  
19 The apparently dire experience with prison privatizations in the United States provides a case in point. 
Oliver Hart, Andrei Shleifer & Robert Vishny, The Proper Scope of Government: Theory and an 
Application to Prisons, 112 QUART. J. ECON. 1127 (1997).  However, other authors have proposed that 
incomplete contracting in the context of public services can be possibly solved with a combination of 
private operation and public (on site) monitoring.  Sandro Cabral, Sergio G. Lazzarini & Paulo Furquim 
de Azevedo, Private Operation with Public Supervision: Evidence of Hybrid Modes of Governance in 
Prisons, 145 PUBLIC CHOICE 281 (2010). 
20 See note 45 infra and accompanying text.  
21See, e.g., JEAN-JACQUES LAFFONT & JEAN TIROLE, A THEORY OF INCENTIVES IN PROCUREMENT AND 
REGULATION 638 (1993) (describing the existence of internal, in addition to external, government control 
as the defining feature of government enterprise). Such vertical integration, however, need not be 
complete.  As Statoil’s experience demonstrates, state-owned firms can be subject to strong regulatory 
authorities.  
22 Shleifer, supra note 13; Oliver E. Williamson, Public and Private Bureaucracies: A Transaction Cost 
Economics Perspective, 15 J. L. ECON. & ORG. 306 (1999). 
23 Eduardo Levy Levy-Yeyati, Alejandro Micco & Ugo G. Panizza, Should the Government Be in the 
Banking Business? The Role of State-Owned and Development Banks (November 2004). IDB Working 
Paper No. 428, available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1818717. 	
	
firm can also be used to promote a public purpose, be it low price to consumers, 
environmental sustainability, or a given macroeconomic objective, from inflation 
control to reduced unemployment. In a mixed enterprise, however, the pursuit of a 
double bottom-line is at odds with the interests of private investors, which then might 
exercise pressure on the firm to ditch its public objectives. But the alternative of whole 
ownership by the state brings about costs of its own: as the government replaces private 
control of the enterprise, the efficiency benefits usually associated with private 
ownership diminish accordingly.   
 
The second positive feature of mixed enterprise is precisely the promise that, by 
welcoming private shareholders in government-controlled firms, improvements in 
operational efficiency will follow. The academic literature has indeed found evidence 
that, although mixed, generally supports the view that the listing of SOEs on domestic 
and international stock exchanges contribute to more efficient management.
24 
Megginson summarizes a series of studies that provide overwhelming support for 
improvements in performance when SOEs’ stocks are publicly traded.
25 Likewise, 
Gupta finds that government-controlled companies which sold minority positions to 
private investors perform better than wholly-owned SOEs in India.
26   
 
Different channels can explain the observed positive effects of the floating of 
SOEs’ stock on firm performance, both from an agency and political views. According 
to the agency view of SOE inefficiency, the absence of private owners imbued with 
profit motive decreases the incentives for competent firm management. According to 
the political view, the administration of SOEs may too often be captured by the rent-
seeking ambition of powerful special interest groups.
27  
 
Listing of mixed enterprises has been indicated as a possible solution to those 
potential conflicts.
28  In Table 1, we summarize how the listing of SOEs affects 
performance and incentives compared to whole ownership by the state. To begin with, 
listed mixed enterprises are subject to greater monitoring by private investors compared 
to wholly-owned government firms. To be sure, the latter could, in theory, also count on 
																																																								
24 Both theoretical and empirical works generally support the view that the floating of minority stock is 
beneficial compared to whole ownership by the government. See Catherine C. Eckel & Aidan R. Vining, 
Elements of a Theory of Mixed Enterprise, 32 SCOT. J. POL. ECON. 82 (1985), for a theoretical model 
suggesting that mixed enterprises may perform better than SOEs, but worse than private firms; Aidan R. 
Vining & Anthony E. Boardman, Ownership Versus Competition: Efficiency in Public Enterprise, 73 
PUB. CHOICE 205, 222 (1992) (finding that mixed enterprises are more profitable than wholly-owned 
SOEs, but less profitable than private firms); Sumit K. Majumdar, Assessing Comparative Efficiency of 
the State-Owned Mixed and Private Sectors in Indian Industry, 96 PUB. CHOICE 1, 13 (1998) (concluding 
that mixed enterprises perform better than wholly-owned SOEs, but worse than private firms).  
25  WILLIAM L. MEGGINSON, THE FINANCIAL ECONOMICS OF PRIVATIZATION 106-7 (2005).  
26  Nandini Gupta, Partial Privatization and Firm Performance, 60 J. FIN. 987 (2005). 
27 For a detailed discussion of the agency and political views of SOE inefficiency, see Rafael La Porta & 
Florencio López-de-Silanes, The Benefits of Privatization: Evidence from Mexico, 114 Quart. J. Econ. 
1193 (1999); Aldo Musacchio & Sergio G. Lazzarini, Leviathan in Business: Varieties of State 
Capitalism and Their Implications for Economic Performance, Harvard Business School Working Paper 
No. 12-1082012, available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2070942.  
28 Gupta, supra note 26. 	
	
private creditors as potential monitors – in so far as they resort to bank credit and/or 
bond issuances, as they habitually do in practice. Nevertheless, the borrowing capacity 
of government firms is often attributable to an implicit bailout guarantee by the 
government. This implicit bailout contract, in turn, provides disincentives for creditors 
to monitor the firm’s day-to-day management. By contrast, equity investors in listed 
SOEs face, in principle, stronger incentives to avail themselves of both voice (provided 
they enjoy voting rights or board representation) and exit (by selling stock, thus 
depressing share prices) in disciplining management.  
 
Moreover, the very availability of stock prices serves an important function: it 
provides the government and the market with timely information about enterprise value, 
which can, in turn, be used to monitor managerial performance or even to design 
incentive-based compensation packages. Finally, as further discussed below, mixed 
enterprises are generally subject to the same legal regime applicable to private firms, 
which can serve as a further constraint to mismanagement, hence boosting operational 
performance. For instance, listed SOEs invariably need to produce financial statements 
audited by a recognized private firm, a feature which is often unavailable when the 
government is the sole owner.  
 
  Third, another rationale for mixed enterprise is that it allows new investments in 
riskier projects with a longer-term perspective. Mixed ownership permits the 
government to share risk with private investors over uncertain ventures. The stock 
offering by Brazil’s Petrobras in 2010 to fund the requisite deep-water technology to 
explore the newly-discovered pre-salt oil fields provides a case in point.
29 To be sure, 
market investors tend to emphasize short-term profitability and may be less “patient” to 
accept riskier, longer-term investments.  This fact notwithstanding, market pressure may 
help avoid short-term pressure in the other direction: governments may want to use 
SOEs to reap dividends associated with the political cycle (e.g. lowering prices to final 
consumers in election years).  
 
Finally, despite the apparent potential for greater private meddling in public 
affairs, listed SOEs might be appealing even for the most committed defenders of 
government intervention. Partial state ownership does not chip away but rather 
reinforces the state’s grip over the economy through “leverage” – a motive which was 
arguably at the heart of China’s decision to list minority stakes in its SOEs.
30 That is, 
the presence of private shareholders allows the state to exercise control over a larger 
number of firms without making a commensurate financial investment. In fact, a fair 
number of mixed enterprises have historically resorted to minority-control structures – 
via corporate pyramids or the issuance of non-voting stock to the public – through 
which the state held uncontested control while holding less than a majority of the total 
																																																								
29 See Part III infra. 
30 Donald  Clarke,  Corporatisation, Not Privatisation, 7 CHINA  L.  &  ECON.  QUART. 27, 28 (2003) 
(explaining that “[a]n explicit goal of enterprise reform [in China] is the magnification of state control 
through leverage,” a concept that is “enshrined in a key Communist Party decision document from 
1999”).  Clarke argues that “the apparent dilution of state ownership through the sale of shares in listed 
companies, which leads some observers to assume the inevitability of eventual privatization, is in fact a 
mechanism for expanding the state’s economic empire.”    	
	
capital.
31  In this respect, it is curious that the incidence of mixed enterprises has been 
comparatively greater in more coordinated civil-law countries than in more liberal 
common-law countries, as the latter have more frequently opted for either wholly public 
or private modes of governance.
32  
 
   
 
Table 1.  The Governance of Wholly-Owned vs. Listed State-Owned Enterprises  
 
 
Theory of SOE 
inefficiency 
Features of enterprises with sole 
government control 
 
How does listing change that 
feature? (Mixed enterprises) 
 
Social  view  Solves difficulty of regulating 
natural monopolies. Government 
self-regulates 
Government can still self-regulate, 
but can be more efficient at 
producing goods (reducing marginal 
costs) 
  Double bottom line (e.g. profit 
maximization jointly with other 
social objectives such as low 
inflation or higher employment) 
Maximization of shareholder value 
subject to political interference if 
the company is not insulated.   
Likely conflict if minority 
shareholders pursuing profitability 
clash with governments following 
social or political goals. 
  Long-term horizon, government as 
patient investor tolerating losses 
 
Likely shorter-term horizon, 
markets are generally impatient with 
respect to losses; yet market 
pressure can avoid short-term 
pressure due to political cycles  
Political view  Appointment of CEOs using criteria 
other than merit (e.g., political 
connections) 
Professional management selected 
by the board of directors. 
Government has strong influence as 
majority shareholder. 
  Poor monitoring: no board of 
directors (ministry regulates) or 
politically appointed board (low 
level of checks and balances) 
Board of directors with some 
independent members and some 
political appointees; depending on 
numbers, it can act as a balance to 
the government and the CEO.  Yet, 
government can co-opt board 
members. 
																																																								
31 The ownership structure of Brazil’s formerly state-owned telecom company Telebras provides a case in 
point. Through the use of non-voting shares and a pyramidal structure, the state was able to exercise 
uncontested control while holding less than one-fifth of the firm’s total equity capital. Mariana 
Pargendler, State Ownership and Corporate Governance, 80 FORDHAM L. REV. 2917, 2939 (2012).  For 
various examples of the use of corporate pyramids by the Italian state, see Colli, supra note 10, at 4-9. 
32 Id. at 2951-60; JOHN  THURSTON,  GOVERNMENT  PROPRIETARY  CORPORATIONS IN THE ENGLISH-
SPEAKING COUNTRIES 5 (1937). 	
	
  Government uses SOEs to smooth 
business cycles (e.g., hiring more or 
firing fewer workers than 
necessary) 
Effect is reduced if the firm is 
isolated from political intervention. 
   Soft budget constraint (bailouts)  No  clear  risk  of  bankruptcy 
(governments will likely bail them 
out) 
Agency  view  Management has low-powered 
incentives 
Pay-for-performance contracts, 
bonuses, and stock options more 
likely 
  Hard to measure performance 
(financial measures are not enough, 
not easy to measure social and 
political goals) 
Stock prices and financial ratios as 
performance metrics. Customer 
satisfaction and feedback to 
measure quality of goods and/or 
services.  
  No clear punishment for managers 
who underperform 
Boards may fire managers who 
underperform  
  Ministries and agencies with weak 
incentives to monitor 
Boards may fire managers who 
underperform 
  No transparency: incomplete 
financial information 
Improved transparency; accounting 
standards following GAAP or IFRS 
    Boards packed with politicians or 
bureaucrats (exacerbates political 
intervention and double-bottom 
line)  
Boards as principals of CEO 
(monitoring/punishing) 
 
 
 
II.    Understanding private investment in SOEs 
 
  The previous section identified the factors and circumstances that render mixed 
enterprises an attractive instrument from the perspective of a social planner. But the fact 
that governments may see benefits in sharing ownership with private investors does not 
entail that the latter will be willing to come on board. One crucial part of the story hence 
remains unexplained: why would private investors opt to join forces in a for-profit 
corporation with the state – an extremely powerful partner which most certainly has 
interests and objectives which are divergent from their own?  
 
A.  Involuntary private investment 
 
  Before we attend to this puzzle, it is worth noting that not all mixed enterprises 
originate from a voluntary investment by private shareholders. On the contrary, 
historical examples abound of situations in which private investors had little or no 
choice with respect to the presence of the state as a majority shareholder in the firm. 
The most extreme instances of this phenomenon concern partial nationalizations in the 
face of an actual or perceived crisis.  	
	
 
  State takeovers of enemy property during wartime illustrate this point. While 
cases exist where all of a company’s capital stock was the object of expropriation, 
governments often acquired partial (though usually controlling) stakes in these foreign-
owned firms. In a study conducted by Kole and Mulherin on 17 nationalizations of 
enemy property by the U.S. government during World War II, the authors found that 
only six of these seizures entailed the acquisition of the totality of the firm’s shares. The 
mean and median stakes acquired by the government were 75 and 77 percent, 
respectively – which meant that in most companies the state opted to join forces with 
private shareholders instead of having the firm all for itself.
33  
 
But it is economic rather than military considerations that have most often 
forged the state’s incursion into private firms. In fact, the line between voluntary and 
involuntary partnering up with the state is sometimes a thin one. In the nineteenth 
century, prior to the advent of general incorporation, revenue-hungry state governments 
in the United States habitually conditioned the grant of a corporate charter on a gift of 
presumably lucrative stocks (as well as the extension of loans) to the state.
34 The same 
type of exchange of stock for the privilege of incorporation also occasionally occurred 
in nineteenth-century Brazil.
35 Although corporate promoters in such cases technically 
consented to the state’s shareholdings, their only alternative would likely have been to 
forego the venture altogether.   
 
More commonly, however, the acquisition of an equity stake by the government 
– even if paid for – is a unilateral move by Leviathan. In response to the 2008 financial 
crisis, the bail-outs of then failing firms such as Citigroup,
36 AIG,
37 and  General 
Motors
38 by the U.S. federal government have all taken the form of capital infusions 
that resulted in partial rather than whole equity ownership by the state. Argentina’s 
recent nationalization of oil company YPF in 2012 was also partial in nature: President 
Cristina Fernández’s administration expropriated the controlling block held by Spanish 
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private company Repsol while maintaining intact the minority public float on the 
Buenos Aires stock exchange held mostly by foreign institutional investors and by 
Argentine private shareholders. Both the efficiency advantages discussed in Part I and 
the lower cost of taking control compared to whole ownership help explain why 
governments might prefer to promote partial rather than full nationalizations.   
 
If the involuntary nature of private participation partially solves the riddle, it 
brings about greater apprehension in terms of property rights’ protection and public 
policy. There is little question that the emergence of the government as the controlling 
shareholder tends to alter the firm’s objectives and management profile, as the state may 
be tempted to pursue political objectives that are inconsistent with profit maximization. 
This concern for the interests of private shareholders who did not consent to the 
government’s takeover implicitly underlies the critical commentary on the financial 
crisis bail-out and the role of the U.S. government as a shareholder.
39 It is precisely to 
avoid these risks that Brazil’s Corporations Law, for instance, grants appraisal rights to 
minority shareholders in the event the government takes control of a private company.
40 
 
B.  Voluntary private investment 
 
It is clear that not all mixed enterprises result from deliberate private investment 
in SOEs. While this makes the initial puzzle smaller than it appeared at first, the 
persistent presence (and apparent expansion in recent years) of voluntary investment in 
listed SOEs is both significant and little understood. In many countries around the 
world, equity markets are underdeveloped – it being difficult enough to convince 
investors to buy minority positions in any publicly-traded firm.
41 Investing  together 
with the government itself – a powerful actor with multiple and varying objectives – 
should, in principle, amount to an even more daunting proposition.  Yet the evidence 
shows that private shareholders are not as averse to investing in SOEs as one might 
have expected.  
 
Voluntary private investment in SOEs takes two primary forms depending on the 
firm’s initial ownership structure: it can be present since the company’s inception or 
result from partial privatizations of wholly-owned SOEs. Although less common in 
recent times, the first model was historically dominant. In the nineteenth-century United 
States, state and local governments habitually acquired stocks in public improvement 
companies, either to obtain a new source of revenue, as previously discussed,
42 or to 
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help finance a critical element of the infrastructure in the region.
43 Similarly, a number 
of prominent Brazilian SOEs – such as steel giant Companhia Siderúrgica Nacional 
(CSN) and Petrobras – were at least formally created as mixed enterprises from the 
outset in the 1950s, but it took a while and substantial promotional efforts for private 
investors to flock in.
44  
 
Yet an even more substantial number of listed SOEs have received private 
investment as a result of the government’s partial divestiture of what were previously 
wholly-owned subsidiaries. Norway’s listing of Statoil in 2001 is but one of numerous 
such examples. Precisely half of the world’s 30 largest national oil companies are listed 
SOEs.
45  With the exception of Petrobras, which has been listed on Brazilian stock 
exchanges for decades (even though none of its voting stock was traded until 2001), all 
of these listed national oil companies were previously wholly-owned SOEs that have 
floated minority shares in local and foreign stock exchanges in the 1990s and early 
2000s.
46  
 
The listing of SOEs, in turn, can be an end state or an initial step in the process 
towards full transition from state to private ownership. Norway, for instance, has 
demonstrated a commitment to maintaining state control and production in the 
country.
47   The option for the first possibility is typically driven by the economic 
considerations discussed in Part I. The choice for partial privatizations as an 
intermediary and temporary stage can be due to different economic considerations. 
First, even if governments have decided to divest their holdings in full, floating 100% of 
the firm’s stock at once could reduce share prices, so revenue maximization may be best 
served by successive offerings in smaller installments. Another explanation for paced 
divestments has to do with the risk of policy reversal. Enrico Perotti has posited that 
gradual sales of shares in privatized firms can also perform a commitment function in 
order to allow the government to progressively establish policy credibility by bearing 
residual risk.
48  
 
C. Legal  factors 
 
Taming the state and taming controlling shareholders are both major institutional 
challenges in their own right. It should therefore come as no surprise that taming 
Leviathan as a majority shareholder is a particularly intricate task for which there is no 
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clear-cut solution. These hybrid entities are thus subject to hybrid legal regimes and 
modes of governance.  We show that this intriguing organizational form is the result of 
multiple legal and extralegal factors – neither of which alone nor in combination 
provide a bulletproof solution to the perils of state control of business ventures. Taken 
together, however, they provide sufficient checks and balances, making mixed 
enterprises far more workable and durable than most would have expected.  
 
  As suggested by the extensive and controversial literature on “Law and 
Finance,” legal protection for minority investors is an important determinant of the 
demand for stocks in publicly-traded companies and, consequently, for the observed 
level of capital market development.
49   We argue here that legal protections and 
constraints are an integral ingredient for the success of the mixed enterprise form, and a 
factor encouraging private investors to join in. We approach this theme by examining 
three categories of legal factors that provide assurance to private shareholders in SOEs: 
(i) private law protections, (ii) public law constraints, and (iii) legal privileges.  
 
1.  Private law protections 
 
a.  Corporate and securities laws 
 
Mixed enterprises are typically organized as business corporations. Subject to a 
few punctual exceptions – specified in the laws that create them or in a discrete 
statutory section of the corporations statute – listed SOEs are generally subject to the 
same corporate and securities laws applicable to private firms.  To quote a French 
observer of then contemporary nationalizations of the 1940s, the state “had expropriated 
capitalists not only of their enterprises, but also of their experience and their recipes.”
50  
 
The application of a single legal regime for state-controlled and private firms is 
customary and considered a “best practice” for SOEs by the influential OECD 
Guidelines on Corporate Governance of State-Owned Enterprises.
51 But as one of us has 
previously argued, this policy choice is not without costs. Because the interests of the 
state as a controlling shareholder often play a prominent role in corporate law reforms, 
the ensuing unitary corporate law regime (applicable to both state and private firms) 
may turn out to afford insufficient protection of minority shareholders.
52  
 
From the perspective of outside investors in SOEs, however, the application of a 
private law regime provides greater assurance both as to the content and the stability of 
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the underlying rules of the game. At the very least, it makes it costlier for the state to 
overhaul the legal regime in view of its short-term interests. In other words, a unitary 
legal regime provides a useful, albeit imperfect, way for the government to credibly 
commit to protect private investors.  
 
Although  the degree of legal investor protection and its enforcement varies 
widely around the world,
53  certain features are recurrent. Securities laws typically 
mandate the timely disclosure of material information on the company as well as the 
periodical publication of audited financial statements. This, in turn, permits market 
participants to monitor the company’s performance, so that stock prices will reflect a 
combination of the firm’s fundamentals and the prospect of expropriation. Most 
corporate laws also impose (with varying degrees of effectiveness) limitations on 
tunneling and self-dealing transactions by managers and controlling shareholders.
54   
 
Nonetheless, the submission of SOEs to general private and securities laws – 
while helpful in providing assurance to its investors – does not guarantee that SOEs will 
behave like a private firm. First, there is still the possibility of differential enforcement 
of facially uniform regulations, with SOEs effectively being subject to more lenient 
standards. There is evidence suggesting that this may be often the case. Even though 
SOEs dominate China’s capital markets, they receive fewer sanctions from the 
securities agency than do private firms.
55  An event study of Chinese corporate law 
reforms in 2000 showed that only private firms, but not SOEs, experienced abnormal 
positive returns following the enactment of new regulations – hence implying that 
markets do not expect enforcement of stricter standards against government-controlled 
companies.
56  In Brazil, too, the securities commission was historically reluctant to 
punish SOEs for securities laws violations.
57 
 
The internal governance structure of listed SOEs – be it legally mandated or 
voluntarily adopted – also provides for another set of checks and balances. The state 
usually holds a majority of the voting stock in mixed enterprises, which puts it in a 
position of dominance in the general assembly. A number of listed SOEs, however, 
grant voting rights to outside shareholders, which allow them to participate in the 
shareholders’ meeting and, occasionally, even have a deciding voice in matters where 
the government as controlling shareholder is conflicted, as is the case under Brazilian 
law.  
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Listed SOEs also tend to have hybrid boards in one form or another. Their 
hybrid character might derive from a combination (and tension) between technical 
experts and political appointees, the presence of independent directors, or minority 
shareholder representatives to the board, or a mixture of these features. Employee board 
representation (also known as “codetermination”) is also particularly common on SOE 
boards.
58 Although shareholders and employees usually have clashing interests, labor 
representatives in this context might still provide a useful layer of monitoring against 
outright abuse, waste or corruption by the government.
59  
 
Finally, some listed SOEs may also resort to performance-based executive 
compensation as an additional method to align the company’s management with the 
interests of private shareholders.  Managers of SOEs are with recurring frequency not 
paid as bureaucrats on a fixed salary basis, but instead have their remuneration packages 
linked to different metrics of the company’s performance. Either through stock grants, 
stock options, or bonus linked to the company’s financial or operational results, these 
forms of incentive-based compensation can serve as a useful form of institutional 
tension to counterweigh managers’ otherwise unbounded loyalty to the policy interests 
of the government officials that appointed them. Nevertheless, due to bureaucratic 
constraints or pressure from organized groups (e.g. unions of SOEs), the compensation 
packages of SOE managers tend to be low-powered compared to those of private firms.  
 
b.  Cross-listings on foreign exchanges  
  
SOEs may also attempt to credibly commit themselves to honest management 
and minority shareholder protection by listing their shares on foreign exchanges. In his 
review of the large literature on cross-listings, Karolyi summarizes the two competing 
hypotheses to explain why companies choose to list their shares overseas. The market 
segmentation (and liquidity) hypothesis posits that regulatory and information costs 
hinder the flow of capital across borders, so cross-listings allow firms to amplify and 
diversify their investment base. The bonding hypothesis, by contrast, attributes the 
choice of cross-listing to the desire of foreign issuers – especially those coming from 
jurisdictions with weak institutional environments – to commit to the higher standards 
of governance and transparency practiced in the host jurisdiction.
60  
 
Proponents of the bonding hypothesis have presented different pieces of 
evidence in support of this theory. Foreign firms whose home legal systems are weak 
enjoy substantial premiums and a reduction in their cost of capital when they cross-list 
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their stock in U.S. exchanges (though not necessarily in other foreign exchanges, such 
as London).
61 Skeptics have however provided countervailing findings that cast doubt 
on the plausibility of the bonding hypothesis, ranging from the observation that the 
premia associated with cross-listings have a short life, to the conclusion that other 
factors – such as the correlation with U.S. stock market indices – account for the boost 
in performance of foreign company stocks that trade in the United States.
62 
 
Attacks on the bonding hypothesis have also focused on the precise legal 
mechanisms that are meant to make the commitment to protect investors credible. In a 
study of Mexican firms cross-listed in the United States, Jordan Siegel showed that 
enforcement against violations by foreign firms is exceedingly weak, so the bonding 
hypothesis is best described as reflecting “reputational” rather than strictly legal 
bonding.
63  More recent studies have reached divergent conclusions regarding the 
willingness of U.S. regulators to file enforcement actions against foreign firms.
64  
 
Although the promise of bonding to higher governance standards through cross-
listing is unlikely to be bullet-proof, it does provide an extra layer of comfort to private 
investors of SOEs by raising the costs of engaging in abusive practices. SOEs may 
pursue cross-listings as a way to tie the hands of the controlling shareholder (i.e., the 
government), as abuses of minority shareholders could generate international scandal 
and, ultimately, lead to the sanction of de-listing. In fact, both access to foreign capital 
and foreign legal protections has led SOEs to pursue cross-listings with great 
enthusiasm. Studies show that government-controlled firms are far more likely to cross-
list in the United States than are private firms from the same home jurisdiction.
65 
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Overseas listings may be particularly attractive for SOEs for their potential to eliminate 
the conflicts of interest stemming from the state’s dual role as shareholder and regulator 
in domestic markets.  
 
2.  Public law constraints 
 
  a.  Public  law  rules 
 
Listed SOEs are not only generally subject to the same private and securities 
laws applicable to private firms, but also at times to constraints derived from public law 
as well.  It is not uncommon for these hybrid public-private entities to be governed by a 
legal regime that blends elements of both public and private law. Defined by greater 
rigidity and formalities, public law rules have earned a bad reputation, especially when 
applied to commercial ventures. In fact, the desire to evade public law rules underlies 
the widespread “corporatizations” of government agencies.
66 Yet, as we will see in Part 
III, the continued application of some public law constraints might well have beneficial 
properties with respect to listed SOEs.
67   
  
  Well-designed public law rules have a comparative advantage with respect to 
their core competency: constraining state action. The private law regime is based on the 
general assumption that consensual transactions increase social welfare, hence granting 
the parties’ substantial leeway to shape their actions and behavior. Public law, on the 
other hand, is imbued with greater suspicion about government action, and therefore 
seeks to impose limitations on the scope of state discretion. Frequently embodied in 
constitutional provisions or special statutes, public law rules are also harder to change, 
which makes them less susceptible both to efficient revisions and to opportunistic 
regime changes by the ruling government.  
 
 
b.  Different regulatory agencies 
 
  The institution of competing regulatory agencies to oversee SOEs is also a 
promising device to tame Leviathan in business. Inspired on the old wisdom of “pitting 
power against power,” this is an adaptation of the most time-tested mechanism of 
controlling state abuse. The OECD Guidelines on Corporate Governance of SOEs 
specifically recommends the separation of the government agencies responsible for 
exercising the ownership function in government-controlled firms, on the one hand, and 
in regulating industry, on the other, so as to mitigate the potential conflict of interest. 
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 3.  Legal privileges 
 
Although questionable from a welfare standpoint, government ventures often 
enjoy an array of legal privileges that play an important part in explaining their ability 
to lure private shareholders. It is particularly common for governments to confer 
monopoly rights on the firms they control. Beyond an outright grant of monopoly, legal 
privileges can take different forms. SOEs may be the direct beneficiaries of special 
taxes or other government transfers that increase their revenue base.  Moreover, it is 
customary for SOEs to be exempted from bankruptcy laws and to benefit from an 
implicit government guarantee.
68 This can encourage private investors to lend to SOEs 
on favorable terms. A lower cost of debt, in turn, indirectly increases profitability, thus 
making the company more attractive to equity investors as well.   
 
The point here is not to evaluate these privileges from a normative perspective. 
Standard recommendations customarily go against the grant of legal privileges or 
monopoly rights so as not to distort competition – for good and obvious reasons that do 
not merit extended discussion here.
69  These favors, however, go a long way in 
explaining why private investors may voluntarily join sides with the state despite the 
apparent risks and conflicts of interest involved. 
 
D. Extralegal  factors 
 
Finally, aside from legal constraints, there are several extralegal factors that 
entice investors to invest in SOEs.   
 
1.  Market structure 
 
Although government ownership and monopolistic exploitation of industry are 
not inevitably intertwined, SOEs very often possess market power. This privileged 
position typically derives either from outright monopoly grants by the government or 
from industry characteristics – natural monopoly or “strategic” activities – that have 
called for the government’s intervention in the first place.  Monopoly rents, in turn, are 
evidently attractive to private investors. Even if the state has political objectives to 
fulfill, there should be sufficient money left on the table to provide for decent returns.    
 
From a private shareholders’ standpoint, the attractiveness of a monopolistic 
position may be easier to grasp, but the countervailing benefits of competition are not 
negligible. At the cost of eliminating rents, competitive market pressures are a source of 
discipline for managers of SOEs. In their review of the privatizations’ literature, 
Megginson and Netter note that the effects of competition on SOE efficiency can be 
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exceedingly strong even in the absence of ownership changes.
70  Similarly, in a study of 
Indonesian firms, Bartel and Harrison find that SOEs facing competitive pressures 
perform as well as private firms.
71 Competition, when available, eliminates rents but 
impose another form of constraint on state-owned firms. Large institutional investors 
that look for firms with good corporate governance in general, may prefer SOEs that 
operate in more competitive environments. Yet, investors may have higher returns in 
SOEs that operate in a monopoly setting, as long as corporate governance and reporting 
arrangements stemming from listing align the incentives of managers and minimize 
abuses of minority shareholder rights.  
 
2.  Political and democratic control  
 
  If SOEs face a greater risk of misbehavior compared to private firms, they also 
receive greater media and political scrutiny that can help deter abuse. Media pressure 
can be an effective remedy against private benefits of control,
72 and listed SOEs are 
more frequently the object of media reports and congressional investigations than are 
private firms.  This does not prevent public officials from using SOEs to pursue popular 
objectives, but at least reduces the risk of corruption and outright self-dealing.     
  
 3.  Reputation 
 
  Reputation can be an effective substitute for legal protections in a repeat-play 
game. So long as the government has an interest in maintaining its mixed enterprise 
strategy, it must not expropriate current investors, as this will make it harder for the 
state to raise outside equity in the future. Even in the absence of formal legal 
protections, governments can resort to generous dividend policies in order to signal their 
commitment to stock profitability.
73 The pervasive use of sovereign debt shows how, 
when coupled with internal checks-and-balances,
74 reputational concerns can discourage 
defaults in a context where effective legal enforcement of contracts is not available.  
 
 4.    Investors’ need to diversify their portfolio 
  
Beyond all the changes in governance in SOEs and the legal conditions that 
might make investment in the equity (or bonds) of a state-owned enterprise, investors 
																																																								
70  William L. Megginson & Jeffry Netter, From State to Market: A Survey of Empirical Studies on 
Privatizations, 39 J. ECON. LIT. 321, 332 (2001).  
71  Ann P. Bartel & Ann E. Harrison, Ownership versus Environment: Disentangling the Sources of 
Public-Sector Inefficiency, 87 REV. ECON. & STAT. 135, 137 (2005). 
72 Alexander Dyck & Luigi Zingales, Private Benefits of Control: An International Comparison, 59 J. 
FIN. 537, 590 (2004). 
73 Brian R. Cheffins, History and the Global Corporate Governance Revolution:  The U.K. Perspective, 
43 BUS. HIST. 87, 100 (2001) (arguing that U.K. companies in the first part of the twentieth century 
resorted to a stable record of dividend payments as a reputational device to reassure investors in the 
absence of other, more formal legal protections).  
74 Douglass C. North & Barry R. Weingast, Constitutions and Commitment: The Evolution of Institutional 
Governing Public Choice in Seventeenth-Century England, 49 J. ECON. HIST. 803 (1989) (highlighting 
the role of internal checks-and-balances in ensuring England’s access to capital markets following the 
Glorious Revolution).  	
	
may also like to purchase the securities SOEs issue simply as part of the need to 
diversify their portfolio or to include exposure to a specific industry or country, or both. 
The sheer size of SOEs in many markets forces local and foreign investors who are 
looking to diversify their portfolio to invest in these firms. For instance, a foreign 
investor looking to diversify her portfolio by including Brazilian stocks may have to 
buy shares in SOEs because they represent 30-40% of stock market capitalization in the 
country. In China, firms ultimately controlled by the state or by a state-owned holding 
company (e.g., SASAC), represent close to 80% of stock market capitalization.
75 An 
investor looking to include Chinese stocks in her portfolio will have, almost by force, to 
invest in SOEs. The same may happen with an investor that is trying to construct a 
diversified portfolio of energy firms. Since some of the largest firms worldwide are 
state-owned, these investors may have to include a mixed enterprise such as Petrobras, 
Statoil, Sinopec, CNOCC, or Gazprom. That is, it is very hard for investors to shy away 
from investing in SOEs. SOEs accounted for 9 out of the 15 largest initial public 
offerings between 2005 and 2012, and for the two or three largest offerings among 
them.
76 
  
5.   Ex ante discounting  
 
  Last, when investors participate in SOEs voluntarily, they can and do adjust the 
price they are willing to pay for these securities to compensate for the risk that the 
government as controlling shareholder might pursue objectives that are not in their or 
the firm’s best interests. Not only the presence of the government as a controlling 
shareholder is well known, but the public disclosure documents of listed SOEs describe 
the various risks associated with state control of the firm.
77  It should come as no 
surprise that, among the world’s 100 largest companies by mid-2012, the top four most 
“discounted” firms (measured by their price-to-book ratios) were SOEs.
78  
 
Discounting, however, may not work well if the extent and incidence of 
interference is too uncertain. This should be particularly relevant in moments of 
governmental transition involving political parties with distinct ideologies. Therefore, 
the very possibility of discounting as a response to the risk of political interference 
depends on the previously discussed legal and extralegal constraints on the government 
as a controlling shareholder.   
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III.   Comparative Case Studies 
 
In light of our previous discussion, we now present some comparative cases 
studies on three national oil companies (NOCs): Brazil’s Petrobras, Norway’s Statoil 
and Mexico’s Pemex. In Table 2 we include some basic corporate characteristics of two 
mixed, listed enterprises – Petrobras and Statoil – as well as of Pemex, a non-listed, 
wholly-owned instrumentality of the Mexican government, as a control case. These 
comparisons allow us to study the main differences between whole and mixed 
government ownership, as well as the variation in the governance structure and the level 
of political intervention among listed firms.  
 
A quick look into the history of these NOCs reveals that state control of local 
companies emerged under different circumstances and for divergent reasons. The oldest 
among them, Pemex (short form for Petroleos Mexicanos) was created in 1938 as a 
result of the world’s first large-scale nationalization in the oil industry.
79 The full state 
takeover of the 17 foreign oil companies then operating in the country followed major 
labor revolts and the firms’ subsequent refusal to follow court decisions siding with the 
employees.
80 Although employee interests played a prominent part in Pemex’s creation 
and continue to influence its governance, this very large SOE is best known for its 
national monopoly as well as its contribution to the government’s finances. As of 2011, 
it accounted for over one-third of the revenues of the Mexican state, thus 
proportionately reducing the country’s tax burden. As a wholly-owned instrumentality 
of the Mexican government, Pemex has private debt, but not equity, investors. 
 
Brazil’s Petrobras has been formally a mixed enterprise since the outset of its 
creation in 1953, even if the lion’s share of its financing came directly from the state. Its 
founding followed a nationalistic campaign known as “the oil is ours” and great hopes 
to find promising oilfields along Brazil’s shores to propel the country’s economic and 
industrial development. Investment by (Brazilian) private shareholders was initially 
compulsory, deriving from a mandatory tax on automobile owners in exchange for 
shares. By the 1970s, Petrobras’s stock was one of the most traded on Brazilian stock 
exchanges, but it was not until the 1990s that its monopoly was relaxed, the government 
floated a larger minority of its stake, and it began issuing ADRs on the NYSE.  
 
Finally, Statoil was established as a wholly-owned SOE in 1972 with the goal of 
promoting the development of Norway’s oil incipient industry, which also came to rely 
on private firms. The company was partly privatized in 2001, when minority stakes 
were successfully listed both on the Oslo Stock Exchange and on the NYSE. Statoil 
then merged with sister state-controlled oil firm Hydro in 2006 to become the world’s 
biggest offshore operator.    
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A.  Ownership and governance 
 
1.  Board composition 
 
In Table 2, we show variation in degree of state ownership and control (the share 
of equity and votes held by the government) and in the levels of managerial autonomy 
conferred on the company (the extent to which the firm controls the use of its own 
resources independently of government approval). As noted above, Pemex is a nonlisted 
public enterprise that has since 2008 adopted most of the features of state-owned 
“corporatized” firms.  Petrobras and Statoil, on the other hand, are state-controlled firms 
with shares listed in local exchanges as well as ADRs (American Depositary Receipts) 
traded on the New York Stock Exchange. Yet, at a glance, the makeup of all three 
boards of directors looks very similar: they are all relatively large and boast external 
members.  
 
At Pemex, however, the only external members are full-time directors (an 
anomaly) appointed by the dominant political parties in Congress. As a result,  the so-
called “external” members of the board have in fact a direct connection to the 
government, which accentuates political intervention in the firm. Furthermore, 
government officials are among the non-external members of the boards of Petrobras 
and Pemex. In both of those firms external members make up a minority of directors, so 
the board is still heavily influenced by the government. Statoil is a unique case in which 
the board is composed by a majority of external members who are relatively 
independent from the government.  
 
Indeed, Norwegian law has long barred the presence of government officials on 
Statoil’s board of directors. In 1962, there was an accident in a state-owned mining 
company that had the Minister of Industry serving on the board. A political scandal 
ensued, blaming the accident on government negligence; the Labour government lost a 
confidence vote because of that. The solution was to prohibit public servants from 
serving on boards, so as to “[protect] politicians and government officials when state-
owned ventures go bad.”
81  
 
  Conversely, all three companies have employee representatives serving on their 
boards. At five board members selected by the Petroleum Workers’ Union (Sindicato de 
Trajadores Petroleros de la República Mexicana), the degree of labor involvement in 
Pemex is substantial, perhaps as a vestige of employee revolts preceding the company’s 
nationalization. In accordance with Norwegian law governing private firms, Statoil has 
three employee representatives on its board. At Petrobras, the presence of one labor 
representative on the board is far more modest and recent, dating back to a 2010 statute 
mandating the presence of an employee representatitive on boards of federal SOEs. 
Although the conflicts of interest between shareholders (who aim for maximum 
financial returns) and employees (who seek higher salaries) are well known, both 
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groups share an interest in reducing political interference so as to maximize the firm’s 
revenue. Indeed, the employee representative sitting on Petrobras’s board of directors 
(Conselho de Administração) has come to openly criticized what he sees as excessive 
political interference in the firm’s management to pursue policies that run counter to the 
interests of the company.
82  Of the three NOCs examined, only Petrobras grants a 
minimum of two board seats to minority shareholders, as required under general 
Brazilian corporate law (However, as we describe in Part III.F below, the precise 
practical operation and effectiveness of this right has been recently challenged.)  
 
Therefore, the composition of the boards of directors of Statoil and Petrobras 
differs sharply in their mix of public and private involvement, suggesting there is no 
silver bullet for reassuring investors that these state-owned companies will not fall prey 
of political intervention. In the Norwegian company, the government selects most 
directors, but none of them are state officials. In the Brazilian oil giant, by contrast, a 
majority of government officials interacts with elected representatives of employees and 
minority shareholders.   
 
2.  Ownership structure 
 
The ownership structure of NOCs underscores the robust private interest in 
state-controlled firms. Despite the fact that in both Petrobras and Statoil the government 
has uncontested control over the firm by holding a majority of the voting stock, we see a 
large proportion of equity owned by minority investors. In Petrobras, private voting and 
nonvoting shareholders get a majority of the company’s cash flow rights. In Statoil, 
minority shareholders have 33 percent of cash flow rights. Furthermore, Petrobras’s 
charter, in accordance with Brazilian corporate law, allows minority shareholders to 
vote as a bloc and elect up to two of the external board members, if a greater number of 
seats is not available under cumulative voting.  
 
 
Table 2. Corporate Governance in Petrobras, Statoil, and Pemex (July 2012) 
   Petrobras Statoil  Pemex 
Corporate governance      
Is it chartered as a standalone 
company?  Yes   Yes   No 
Listed on a local stock exchange  Yes (São Paulo)  Yes (Oslo)  No 
Cross-listed stock  Yes (NYSE)  Yes (NYSE)  No 
Board of directors (BOD)      
Number of seats  9  10  15 
Number of external directors  2  7  4 
Number of employee representatives  1  3  5 
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External directors are a majority?  No  Yes  No 
Are there government officials on 
BOD? Yes  No  Yes 
Shareholder rights and gov't power      
Dual-class shares (voting/nonvoting) 
Yes (voting shares 
and nonvoting 
preferred shares) 
One class (one-
share, one-vote)  Not applicable 
Share of votes held by government 
50.2% (gov’t) + 8.2% 
(gov’t owned 
BNDESPAR) 67%  100% 
Gov’t cash flow rights (% of total 
equity) 
28.70% (gov’t) + 
15% (gov’t owned 
BNDESPAR) 67%  100% 
Do minority shareholders have the 
right to elect board members? 
Yes, two (or greater 
under cumulative 
voting)   No  Not applicable 
Returns to government      
Taxes as a % of profits (2011) 
25.2% net (34% 
minus deductions) 
28% of profits 
minus deductions 
for exploration 
and depreciation  56.2% of profits 
Additional payments to government  Dividends 
Dividends 
according to cash 
flow rights + a tax 
of 3% on all 
dividends 
All additional 
profits minus 
deductions for 
exploration and 
depreciation 
Source: Compiled from the companies’ websites and from questionnaires sent to Pemex. 
 
3.  Financial independence and time horizon 
 
We also show in the table the extent to which the governments of Brazil, 
Norway, and Mexico tax these firms and how much the government takes in the form of 
dividends. The fiscal regimes of Petrobras and Statoil seem extremely similar. The 
government takes between 25 and 28 percent in taxes and then gets dividends according 
to the cash-flow rights of its shares (28.7 percent in Petrobras and 67 percent in Statoil). 
In Mexico, the government takes all of Pemex’s profits—about 56 percent in taxes and 
the rest in dividends—then gives Pemex back some deductions for depreciation and to 
pay for exploration projects. That means that in Mexico Pemex has to bargain with the 
government to get funds to pursue exploration and development, while in Petrobras and 
Statoil the management of the firm has more financial autonomy from the government 
and can use retained earnings to finance investment.  
 
A key concern in NOCs is how financially independent the firm is from the 
government. As we saw in Table 2, Pemex entirely lacks the capacity to retain earnings 
to make investments. In Table 3 we analyze the financial independence of each of our 
three firms in regards to large investment decisions. We can see that only the 
Norwegian government seems to give its national oil company complete budgetary 	
	
autonomy. Petrobras needs government approval for certain large investment projects, 
while Pemex needs approval for investment projects and for its whole budget. In fact, 
Pemex has an internal control office and, additionally, needs to run major budget 
changes through the Minister of Finance. Of the three, then, Pemex has the least 
flexibility when it comes to the use of the resources it generates. 
 
Moreover, as we previously discussed, the issue of how SOEs compare to 
private firms in terms of investment time horizon and risk appetite remains 
controversial. On the one hand, advocates of state ownership view private capital 
markets as excessively focused on short-term gain, which could lead private companies 
to forego profitable but risky and patient investments in research and development. On 
the other hand, there is the risk that election cycles could render SOEs even more 
concerned with short-term results than their private counterparts.  
 
We think financial autonomy, in fact, allows national oil companies to focus on 
long-term investments, while also isolating themselves from some of the short-term 
financial considerations of governments. In the case of Pemex, the Mexican government 
maximizes the extraction of rents in the short run, to boost its government budget, while 
giving up the possibility of spending more on research and development (R&D) or 
exploration. In Petrobras and Statoil, their relative financial autonomy allows them to 
set aside funds to invest in long term projects, such as R&D, or exploration. Therefore, 
while Pemex has invested, on average, between $1 and $3 billion dollars per year in the 
last five years, Petrobras has had capital expenditures of between $5 and $40 billion. In 
the same way, in 2011, Petrobras spent the most (US$1.5 bi) and Pemex the least 
(US$344 mi) in  R&D, with Statoil falling in between. 
 
Yet, our case studies do not help us get a clear answer as to whether mixed 
enterprises in the oil industry focus on short-term results, as a response to investors, or 
on the maximization of oil rents in the long run for the majority shareholder (the 
government). It seems like the answer is somewhere in between. In the case of 
Petrobras and Statoil, given their large investment budgets, we think that at least we can 
say the management of these firms is not only  preoccupied with short-term 
considerations. In Pemex, the government has privileged extraction of rents in the short 
run over the maximization of rents in the long run and production suffered a steep 
decline between 2004 and 2009 for lack of investment in exploration and 
development.
83 
 
 
4.  Management selection and compensation 
 
Since governments traditionally intervened in SOEs by nominating as managers 
either politicians or politically-connected individuals, one concern for investors of 
national oil companies is the issue of how the top management of such firms is selected. 
In Table 3, we show a series of variables of interest with which to compare these three 
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firms in terms of the selection process for their CEOs, their backgrounds, and whether 
their compensation packages are incentive-compatible.  
 
In terms of management selection, we can see that Petrobras’s and Statoil’s 
CEOs are selected by the board of directors, while Pemex’s CEO is directly appointed 
by the president of Mexico. In Petrobras, however, the board is packed with government 
officials and government-appointed members.  Therefore, the appointment of the CEO, 
in practice, can be a highly political process, with the president of Brazil having 
ultimate fiat power when it comes to who runs Petrobras and how.  Yet, when we code 
for the background of the CEOs of these three firms, we find that both Petrobras and 
Statoil have had far fewer politicians appointed as CEOs than Pemex. Moreover, at 
Pemex the CEOs change whenever a new president is elected, while in Statoil the terms 
seem to be more stable and long lasting. In Petrobras, CEOs have short tenures, but 
their appointment usually does not coincide with presidential elections. 
  
A major source of concern for investors in SOEs is whether managers have 
incentives to improve the company’s financial performance. In wholly-owned SOEs, 
CEOs usually have conflicting objectives that discourage them from running the firms 
profitably. Also, large SOEs are usually too big to fail and are commonly bailed out by 
governments when they face significant losses (i.e., CEOs of SOEs face a soft-budget 
constraint), which further compromises the incentives for financially responsible 
management. As we can see in Table 3, however, mixed enterprises such as Petrobras 
and Statoil have executive compensation packages that include “pay-for-performance” 
components. Statoil’s CEO also owns a significant amount of shares in the company, 
thus further aligning his incentives with those of private stockholders.   
 
One important way to minimize principal-agent problems in any firm is to have 
shareholders and other stakeholders (e.g., creditors) closely monitor the firm’s 
management. Effective monitoring, in turn, presupposes a certain level of financial 
transparency with standardized quality. In state-owned enterprises that do not have 
private investors, the difficulty in monitoring by stakeholders is compounded by the fact 
that CEOs may not want to have good financials that allow the government to scrutinize 
their performance. Mixed enterprises such as Petrobras and Statoil, however, have 
facilitated the monitoring process by having audited financials that comply with 
International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS), which are the standards set by the 
International Accounting Standards Board. In order to guarantee their quality, both 
firms hire internationally recognized accounting firms to audit their quarterly financials. 
Having such transparent financial reporting standards allows large institutional investors 
to more effectively monitor managers.  In the case of Petrobras, Brazilian pension funds 
and Black Rock are the largest institutional investors monitoring management and 
acting as checks and balances on the controlling shareholder (i.e., the Brazilian 
government). In the case of Statoil, the Norwegian National Insurance Fund is the 
largest institutional investor. Additionally, these mixed enterprises issue debt in public 
markets and, thus, have international credit rating agencies such as S&P and Moody’s 
rate their local- and foreign-currency denominated debt. These rating agencies act as an 	
	
additional gatekeeper, even though the implicit government guarantee enjoyed by some 
SOEs could decrease creditors’ incentives to monitor the firm closely.  
 
  All of these features are not exclusive of publicly-traded mixed enterprises, 
though. Pemex, a corporatized firm, issues debt in international markets and, therefore, 
has to comply with the same level of financial reporting that is required of Petrobras and 
Statoil.   
 
 
Table 3. CEOs, Incentives, and Reporting in Petrobras, Statoil, and Pemex (July 2012) 
   Petrobras Statoil  Pemex 
CEOs/incentives      
Responsibility for CEO 
appointment  Board of directors  Board of directors  President of Mexico 
Current CEO 
Maria das Graças 
Foster (technical CEO, 
though with close ties 
to President Dilma 
Roussef) 
Helge Lund 
(technical-politician) 
Juan José Suárez 
Coppel (technical) 
Background (1990-2012)          
Number of CEOs  10  6  9 
Number of CEOs with 
technical background (even if 
they were politicians)*  10  4  6 
CEOs who were politicians 
(% of all CEOs) 
1 
 (10%)  
4  
(40%) 
5 
(55%) 
Avg. CEO tenure in years  2.7  6.7  3.2 
Do CEOs usually change after 
presidential elections?  In 3 out of 7 elections  No  Yes 
CEO compensation has pay-
for-performance component  Yes  Yes  No 
CEOs get stock options  No  Yes  No 
CEOs have shares  Yes  Yes  No 
Financial information and 
transparency      
Autonomous budget 
No, some investments 
need gov't approval  Yes 
No, some 
investments need 
gov't approval 
Audited financials (by a 
private firm)  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Accounting standards  IFRS  IFRS  IFRS (since 2012) 
Frequency of financial 
reporting Quarterly  Quarterly  Quarterly 
Main institutional investors  
Local pension funds, 
Black Rock 
Norwegian national 
insurance fund 
Bondholders & Ex-
Im Bank 	
	
S&P rating of long-term 
domestic currency bonds  BBB  AA-  A- 
Regulation  National Oil Agency  
(ANP), linked to the 
Ministry of Mines and 
Energy 
Norwegian 
Petroleum 
Directorate (NPD), 
reporting to the 
Ministry of 
Petroleum and 
Energy 
National 
Carbohydrates 
Commission (CNH 
in Spanish), a 
decentralized agency 
linked to the 
Ministry of Energy 
(SENER) 
Source: Compiled from the companies’ websites and from questionnaires sent to Pemex.   
Note: IFRS stands for International Financial Reporting Standards, which are the standards set by the 
International Accounting Standards Board. IFRS usually requires companies to disclose more detailed 
accounts than the GenerallyAccepted Accounting Principles (GAAP), which are the required accounting 
standards to list shares or trade bonds on the New York Stock Exchange. 
*We code CEOs as having a technical background if they studied engineering, economics, business or 
geology or had a career in the oil industry before running for a political post or being appointed for a 
cabinet position. 
 
 
B.  Regulation and market structure 
 
1.  Industry regulation 
 
All three NOCs are subject to supervision by established regulatory agencies 
that report to governmental bodies (such as Ministries of Energy) and are, at least on 
paper, run by technical professionals.  However, a deeper inspection of the roles of 
those agencies reveals profound differences.  Brazil’s National Oil Agency (ANP), 
which was created in 1997 as a counterweight to the end of Petrobras’s legal monopoly, 
is still relatively weak and heavily influenced by the executive. Furthermore, it has had 
a stained reputation since ANP officials were caught requesting bribes from private 
companies.
84 As a consequence, the president of Brazil and the Minister of Mines and 
Energy are the most important “regulators” of Petrobras. 
 
In Mexico, the government passed a law in 2008 creating the National 
Carbohydrates Commission (Comisión Nacional de Hidrocarburos – CNH). It was 
intended to be an autonomous agency run by commissioners with technical knowledge 
of the sector. In practice, however, the commissioners were not experts—at least, not all 
of them—and they have had some differences with Pemex. Moreover, the de facto 
regulator of Pemex’s actions is the Ministry of Finance, which controls the budget of 
Pemex (line by line) and whose minister serves as chairman of Pemex’s board.  
 
In contrast to the Mexican and Brazilian cases, the Norwegian Petroleum 
Directorate (NPD), although also subordinate to the Ministry, is functionally 
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autonomous and strong. It has a longer history, as it was instituted in 1972 to regulate 
Norway’s public and private actors in the oil industry. As put by Thurber and Istad:
 85 
 
Since the Norwegian Petroleum Directorate formally reported to the Ministry, it 
was initially felt necessary to have an independent board oversee the directorate 
to guarantee its independence from politics. In time, however, this board was 
judged to be superfluous, and in 1991 it was disbanded... What ultimately 
protected the NPD from undue interference was the growing dependence of the 
Ministry on it for critical technical services and advice. (One early Ministry 
official said that the NPD tended to be viewed within the Ministry as its own 
technical department.) Any actions that would have severely disrupted this 
function would have been detrimental to both organizations. 
 
The existence of an autonomous regulatory agency thus helped create 
institutional checks and balances that reduced the government’s ability to directly 
intervene in the company.  And, in the case of NPD, such autonomy was apparently due 
to the presence of technical regulators with distinct knowledge and capabilities. 
 
2.  Labor laws 
 
Labor laws illustrate how the precise combination between public and private 
elements in mixed enterprises can vary widely depending on the institutional context At 
one end of the spectrum, Norway imposes on Statoil precisely the same laws applicable 
to private companies regarding the commercial contracting process, employee 
recruitment and labor matters. By contrast, the legal regime applicable to Brazil’s 
Petrobras is markedly hybrid. Its employees are subject to the same labor laws 
governing private firms – the labor-friendly Consolidação das Leis do Trabalho – 
CLT.
86 Unlike public servants in Brazil, Petrobras’s employees do not have tenure and 
can be fired at will.
87  Differently from private companies, however, Petrobras must 
generally abide by a distinct process for employee recruitment through a 
constitutionally mandated public contest of examinations and titles.
88   
 
The fusion of public and private law regimes, in this case, serves to mitigate the 
disadvantages of each in the peculiar SOE context. While ample leeway for hiring and 
firing decisions is generally thought to be most efficient for private companies, there is 
the risk that, in a government-controlled firm, this regime might lead to staffing 
decisions being made according to political alliances, ideology or cronyism rather than 
merit and technical considerations. Although public examinations measure soft skills 
imperfectly, they favor the recruitment of a technically-qualified labor force. At the 
same time, the ability to dismiss underperforming employees mitigates incentives 
problems.  
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3.  Market structure 
 
There are also important differences in terms of market competition. For most of 
its history, Petrobras had a legal monopoly on  research, extraction, refining, and 
transportation. Even though a 1995 constitutional amendment permitted the federal 
government to grant oil exploration rights to private firms pursuant to concession 
agreements, thus opening up the possibility of competition, Petrobras continues to enjoy 
a de facto monopoly, similarly to Pemex. It is hardly surprising that monopoly rents can 
look particularly attractive to private investors. Statoil, in contrast, was subject to 
domestic and foreign competition throughout its history. Although its merger with 
domestic rival Hydro in 2007 created a position of near monopoly in the domestic 
market, Statoil has been exposed to a number of foreign competitors given its more 
aggressive strategy of international expansion.
89  
 
C.  Financial performance 
 
As discussed in Part I, the promise of improvements in operational efficiency 
and performance is a main driving force behind minority private ownership in SOEs. 
According to this view, listed SOEs should boast financial results that are superior to 
those of wholly-owned state ventures. Based on our sample, we should expect Pemex to 
underperform both Petrobras and Statoil from a financial standpoint.  
 
To see if this expectation holds, we collected financial data on the three 
companies from 1998 to 2011.  We also split this window into two subperiods, 1998-
2002 and 2003-2011, given that after 2002 oil prices sharply increased. Consistent with 
the original prediction, we find that Petrobras and Statoil are profitable, while Pemex 
reports losses in all periods. The return on assets (net profit to total assets) of Statoil, 
Petrobras and Pemex were on average 8%, 11% and -4% respectively in 1998-2011.  
This lends support for the view that the institutional arrangements associated with 
mixed ownership create higher commitment towards superior profitability. 
Nevertheless, we do not find substantial differences in terms of the other accounting 
indicators except for the current liquidity ratio: although still liquid, Statoil exhibited a 
lower ratio than the other NOCs, especially after 2003. 
 
For our purposes, however, the greater puzzle is why private investors are 
willing to join forces with the government as a controlling shareholder. Assuming that 
private shareholders are rational, their voluntary presence in SOEs suggests that these 
firms can indeed provide profitable investment opportunities. We would expect listed 
SOEs to post mostly positive financial results – as they indeed do. Theory alone, 
however, cannot determine if the interest of private investors is primarily due to (i) 
countervailing advantages of mixed enterprises (e.g., due to governmental privileges), 
(ii) ex ante discounting by investors, so that, in order to account for the risk of political 
intervention, their stock prices become inordinately cheap, or (iii) governance and legal 
mechanisms that mitigate agency costs, making listed SOEs behave similarly to private 
sector firms.  
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A more direct comparison between Petrobras and Statoil shows that Statoil has 
underperformed Petrobras in terms of return of assets. On the other hand, Statoil’s 
Tobin’s q (market value of stock plus debt divided to total assets) and especially its 
price-to-book ratio are higher than Petrobras’s. This finding suggests that improved 
governance and checks-and-balances against political interference in Statoil, compared 
to Petrobras, has resulted in superior market valuation, even considering Statoil’s 
slightly lower profitability. In other words, investors might require greater financial 
returns and offer steeper discounts in order to invest in a state-owned enterprise that is 
more vulnerable to political interference. 
 
It is also interesting to examine how the share prices of Petrobras and Statoil 
fared compared to those of private international oil companies (IOCs). Figure 1 shows 
the evolution of share prices departing from June 2001. The advantage of this temporal 
window is that it covers the marked increase in oil prices after 2003 and hence allows us 
to assess the impact of changing market conditions on the relative market evolution of 
share prices. Our previous discussion on ex ante discounting suggests that the share 
prices of SOEs, compared to IOCs, might be relatively less responsive to a thriving oil 
market because increases in perceived rents are constrained or captured by local 
governments, which are their majority shareholders.  
 
Figure 1, however, indicates an opposite pattern. Share prices of Petrobras and 
Statoil escalated at a much higher pace than the share prices of private IOCs. In the case 
of Petrobras, this finding can be partially explained by the announced discovery of new 
pre-salt (deep-water) oil fields in Brazil in 2007, which illustrates how a privileged 
relationship with the government can also be a significant boon at certain times.
90  
 
However, we also see in Figure 1 that the share prices of Petrobras rapidly 
declined after 2009, and eventually fell below Statoil’s prices after 2012. This is likely a 
result of escalating governmental interference at Petrobras, as discussed earlier, as well 
as delays in the exploitation of the newly discovered pre-salt oil fields.  
 
Table 4. Financial Comparison of Petrobras, Statoil, and Pemex (millions of dollars) 
  1998-2011 1998-2002 2003-2011 
  Petrobras Pemex Statoil Petrobras Pemex Statoil Petrobras Pemex Statoil
Financial data    
Revenues 62,156  76,895 57,360 21,683 45,209 22,816 84,640 90,977 76,551
Net profit  9,810  -3,425 4,447 2,944 -1,932 1,295 13,624  -4,089 6,197
Total debt  53,671  17,845 36,630 19,129 15,947 16,642 72,862 18,688 47,735
Current assets  26,670  22,124 14,543 10,406 10,247 6,371 35,706 27,402 19,083
Current liabilities  18,780  14,493 13,892 9,386 9,439 6,475 23,999 16,739 18,013
																																																								
90 The Brazilian government did not hesitate to transfer the exploration rights in the new oilfields to 
Petrobras, rather than auctioning them off to interested private oil companies (even though, as we will see 
in Part III.D below, the particular purchase price was challenged by investors). 	
	
Total assets  109,100  89,141 56,592 31,803 60,516 23,365 152,043 101,863 75,051
Fixed assets  62,631  59,866 32,928 12,576 41,894 14,137 90,440 67,854 43,368
Shareholders' equity  55,429  3,290 19,962 12,674 13,959 6,723 79,182 -1,452 27,317
Accounting ratios    
Liquidity ratio (current 
assets/current liabilities) 
1.33 1.53 1.02 1.11 1.09 0.99 1.45 1.64 1.05
Leverage (total 
debt/total assets) 
0.26 0.20 0.18 0.29 0.26 0.23 0.24 0.18 0.15
Fixed investment (fixed 
assets/total assets) 
0.52 0.67 0.60 0.40 0.69 0.61 0.59 0.67 0.59
ROA (net profit/assets)  0.11 -0.04 0.08 0.09 -0.03 0.06 0.12 -0.04 0.09
Market indicators    
Price-to-book ratio*  1.82  n.a. 2.40 1.78 n.a. 2.40 1.84  n.a. 2.40
Tobin’s q*  1.37  n.a. 1.48 1.24 n.a. 1.37 1.45  n.a. 1.50
Dividend yield*  4.19  n.a. 3.88 4.83 n.a. 4.54 3.84  n.a. 3.73
Source: Bloomberg and Pemex, our calculations. 
* Statoil’s market indicators begin in 2001, when the company became listed.  Pemex is nonlisted. 
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Figure 1. Evolution of Share Prices of Selected NOCs 
Source: Bloomberg.  Crude oil prices refer to Brent quotes. 
 
 
D.  Evidence of remaining political interference 
 
While our case studies cannot fully discern whether countervailing advantages 
of SOEs or ex ante discounting can best explain private investment in listed SOEs, one 
aspect remains clear: while helpful, the corporate governance features of mixed 	
	
enterprises that seek to isolate them from political intervention are not fully effective. 
Petrobras has not managed to shield itself from political intervention, despite its listing 
in New York (through American Depository Receipts) and São Paulo, as well as the 
technical nature of its management.  Consider the case of the public offer of Petrobras’ 
shares in 2010.  On June 22, 2010, the board of directors of Petrobras approved an 
ambitious capital expenditure plan of $224 billion for 2011 to 2014, including 
expenditures to explore and develop the pre-salt oil fields off the coast of São Paulo. 
Foreseeing expenditures on the order of $45 billion per year for at least five years—
more than Petrobras’s cash flows could cover—the company decided to issue a mix of 
debt and equity. In fact, the company planned what might have been the largest public 
offer in the world, with the sale of shares totaling $50 billion.
91 The share issue, in and 
of itself, was a major accomplishment for any corporation, involving six investment 
banks acting as global coordinators and nine as joint managers.
92 
 
The Brazilian government, the controlling shareholder of Petrobras, did not want 
to come across to the Brazilian public as selling its exploration rights to Petrobras too 
cheaply, especially since it was a presidential election year. Technically Petrobras 
would pay $42.5 billion to the government for those rights – a price which was set by 
the government without consultation with (and under protests by) minority 
shareholders. Therefore, as Petrobras sold new shares, the government sold to Petrobras 
the rights to extract five billion barrels of oil at the equivalent price of $8.51 per barrel – 
in a transaction which was carefully designed to evade minority approval requirements 
under Brazil’s corporate law for stock subscriptions that are payable in kind. Due to 
insufficient investor interest for the huge offering, the government decided to use those 
proceeds to purchase new shares, thus increasing its ownership stake in the company. 
Minority shareholders in Petrobras worried about this transaction. Of particular concern 
was the allegedly too high price paid for the exploration rights, the resulting dilution of 
minority shareholders who did not exercise their preemptive rights, the fact that 
exploitation rights were negotiated without consultation with minority shareholders and 
were paid for before they were going to be used.
93 
 
Moreover, in line with the social view of SOEs discussed earlier, Petrobras 
clearly follows a double bottom line. Brazil’s constitution requires congressional 
approval of the annual budgets of SOEs, even if they do not presently receive capital 
infusions from the government and operate as autonomous entities.
94 The company’s 
securities filings warn that “[t]he Brazilian federal government, as our controlling 
																																																								
91 Pargendler, The Unintended Consequences of State Ownership, supra note 52. 
92 The details of the transaction are publicly known in Brazil. Rob Dwyer, How Petrobras Struck $70 
Billion, EUROMONEY, Mar. 2011. 
93  These complaints notwithstanding, the governmental abuse (if any) in fixing allegedly too high a 
purchase price was probably less serious than it could have been. Pargendler, supra note 31, at 2942. 
Reputation likely played a key role: too serious an instance of minority abuse could have jeopardized the 
government’s plans to raise billions of dollars in a contemporary stock offering by Petrobras to fund the 
necessary investments in exploration of the oilfields.  Some of these arguments came out in the press, but 
we also heard some of them from one of the most influential minority investors, who preferred to remain 
anonymous. 
94 Constitution of the Federative Republic of Brazil, art. 165, § 5º, II.  	
	
shareholder, may cause us to pursue certain macroeconomic and social objectives that 
may have a material adverse effect on us”, including meeting “Brazilian consumption 
requirements” and setting prices for crude oil and oil products “below prices prevailing 
in world markets.”
95  
 
For instance, the price of gasoline had been controlled in Brazil for years, but 
direct intervention in the management of the company mounted in early 2012. The 
appointment of Graça Foster as CEO of Petrobras in February 2012 was well received 
by market participants, due to her technical background; she had had a long career at the 
firm and was considered very knowledgeable about the sector. Graça Foster recognized 
that keeping gasoline prices low would undermine profitability and deteriorate the cash 
flow necessary to support future investments.  At the time of her appointment, she gave 
an interview declaring:  
 
If you ask me, is it necessary to adjust the price [of gasoline]?  It is evident that 
it is necessary to adjust the price…  It is not sensible to imagine that someone 
who sells anything—anything at all, a cup, a notepad, gasoline, diesel—should 
not transfer to the market his or her advantages or disadvantages.
96  
 
President Dilma Roussef and her Minister of Energy, however, publicly 
disavowed Graça Foster’s statement and said that the price of gasoline would not be 
raised.  They were both concerned that an increase in gasoline prices would accelerate 
inflation at a moment when the government was trying to force reductions in interest 
rates.  In June 2012, the government allowed a minor adjustment—not enough to 
compensate for the large increases in the price of oil (at that moment trading close to 
$100 per barrel). These price controls directly affect the profitability of Petrobras’s 
refining division.    
 
In May 2012, a group of foreign investors sent a letter to Graça Foster, 
criticizing the company’s investment plan—approved by the board of directors—which 
would invest heavily in refining despite there being no clear plan to lift price controls 
for gasoline.  Echoing these investors’ concerns, Petrobras announced a record loss of 
$1,34 billion reais (around $662 million dollars) in the second quarter of 2012, its first 
loss in 13 years. Even if the loss was related to the write-off of a failed exploration 
attempt offshore, having the price of gasoline capped by the government certainly did 
not help profitability at Petrobras. 
 
Investors also complained that the two board seats that the charter of Petrobras 
(and Brazilian corporate law) guarantees for minority shareholders were not really 
representing minority shareholders.
97   These complaints echoed the concerns of 
																																																								
95 Petrobras Form 20-F Annual Report pursuant to Section 13 or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 
1934 for the fiscal year ended December 31, 2011. 
96 Graça defende correção do preço dos combustíveis [Graça defends adjustment to fuel prices], AGÊNCIA 
ESTADO, Feb. 27, 2012. 
97 Renato Rostás, Estrangeiros criticam eleição de conselho e plano da Petrobras [Foreigners criticize 
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institutional investors Polo Capital and Black Rock, as the candidates they had 
nominated for the board had been defeated. The winners, Jorge Gerdau Johannpeter and 
Josué Gomes da Silva, were seen by these institutional investors as too close to the 
government: the former was a steel industrialist regularly consulted by Presidents Lula 
and Roussef and the latter, also a businessman, was the son of Lula’s vice president.  
They were elected by the pension funds of two SOEs—the banks Banco do Brasil and 
Caixa Econômica Federal—and by BNDESPAR, the investment arm of Brazil’s 
national development bank. The Securities and Exchange Commission of Brazil 
supposedly investigated the incident, but without major consequences. 
 
In addition, Petrobras has procurement policies that force its suppliers to have a 
high national content. Those policies are of interest to the government, the controlling 
shareholder; they promote local investment and employment. But they are equivalent to 
an expropriation of minority shareholders, as national suppliers that are acquiring 
capabilities may be slower or more expensive, which of course can affect the firm’s 
profitability. Last but not least, government interference can also occur to support 
geopolitical projects. In 2005, for example, Petrobras signed up for a joint venture with 
the Venezuelan oil company PDVSA to build a refinery in the Brazilian state of 
Pernambuco. This was a pet project of President Lula, a supporter of Hugo Chávez’s 
regime in Venezuela. Petrobras originally projected costs to be around $2.3 billion, but 
by 2012, the costs were expected to be $20 billion.
98  
 
Such instances of outright interference are arguably much less frequent at 
Statoil.  Yet, it is questionable how much political independence Statoil has in practice. 
Also suggesting the pursuit of political objectives, Statoil lists government control as a 
risk factor by noting that “[t]he interests of our majority shareholder, the State, may not 
always be aligned with the interests of our other shareholders, and this may affect our 
decisions…”
99 In addition, although “direct intervention of the Ministry of Petroleum 
and Energy in Statoil strategy has mostly disappeared, politicians continue to weigh in 
as though they were making policy for the company.”
 100  Two examples illustrate the 
prevalence of political intervention at Statoil. First, in October 2007, the government 
halted further developments of natural gas in the Troll field in Norway “on the grounds 
that such activity would likely harm the ultimate oil recovery from the field…Statoil 
was highly displeased based on commercial considerations.”
 101  Second, in April 2008, 
the Norwegian government filed a suit against Statoil for fees owed by the company for 
the expansion of a gas-processing terminal. “As one Ministry official explained, Statoil 
managers need to be diligent about not giving minority shareholders the impression they 
are paying off their main shareholder.”
 102 
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Not surprisingly, even more acute such issues are now confronting the Mexican 
government, the sole owner of Pemex. On the one hand the Mexican government is 
planning to reform the company and possibly list in Mexico and abroad. The aim of the 
plan is to restructure corporate governance in a way that gives the firm more financial 
autonomy to pursue partnerships with foreign firms for deep water exploration. On the 
other hand, it is not clear the Mexican government can commit to keeping its hands off 
the cash flow of Pemex. Pemex has for decades been the cash cow of the Mexican 
government, providing almost 40% of the total revenues (up to 70% before the 1990s). 
Additionally, the Mexican government controls gas, gasoline, and lubricant prices in a 
way that hurts the profitability of the firm. Moreover, the total take of the government in 
the form of taxes and dividends leaves the firm with little in the form of retained 
earnings to pay for new exploration, R&D, and expansion. Thus, the planned reforms 
would leave the government with less money in the short rune, but without a change in 
the tax regime of Pemex, it would be hard for private investors to be interested in 
buying shares if it were to be privatized.  
 
 
IV.  Conclusion 
 
In this Article, we addressed the puzzle of mixed enterprise. How can we 
explain the very existence of these firms? Why do private investors agree to be minority 
shareholders in companies controlled by governmental entities with objectives that may 
drastically differ from profit maximization?  
 
From the perspective of a social planner, there is evidence that the coexistence 
of minority private investors with state actors can generate improvements in operational 
and financial performance. Yet, from the perspective of private shareholders, their 
investment must pay off. We identified three different factors that explain private 
investor interest: the existence of countervailing privileges from partnering with the 
government, the resort to improved corporate governance and legal constraints that limit 
the opportunity for political abuse, and ex ante price discounting.   
 
An important conclusion is that neither the very presence of private investors 
nor the listing of stock on a major stock exchange solves in and by itself the political 
intervention problem. Carefully-designed governance provisions can mitigate, but not 
eliminate, the degree of political interference to the detriment of minority investors. 
Because distinct governments may change governance rules at their discretion, it is also 
critically important to have a structure of institutional checks-and-balances in place. The 
case of Statoil, for instance, suggests that the presence of a technical, independent 
regulatory agency, with equal influence on private and state-owned firms, can reduce 
the level of outright interference by the government. Consequently, the discount applied 
by private investors may be reduced as well.    
 
Our limited evidence seems inconsistent with the “discounting” hypothesis. The 
stock prices of SOEs actually increased to a greater extent than in the case of private oil 
companies. Indeed, to the extent that the degree and direction of political interference is 	
	
difficult to anticipate, ex ante price discounting by private investors will be imperfect at 
best. Changing patterns of political interference at Petrobras clearly illustrate this point.   
 
 Yet private investors may be willing to accept these risks that remain after all 
legal and extralegal constraints to state abuse are taken into account. This is because 
SOEs may offer countervailing advantages, bringing a substantial stream of rents from 
the (often monopolistic) exploitation of natural resources and public concessions. These 
features may be highly attractive to fund managers and individual investors. In our 
analysis, we observed that the stock prices of SOEs actually increased to a greater 
extent than in the case of private NOCs when oil prices peaked. As another example, a 
report issued by Morgan Stanley in May 2012 argued that although SOEs may be 
“targeting development objectives rather than shareholder returns,” several SOEs have 
outperformed industry peers in emerging markets.
103   
 
We do not purport to offer a definitive answer to the puzzle of private 
investment in SOEs, and much less to suggest that such an answer is likely to be 
uniform. Mixed corporations with state-control and private minority investments remain 
an under-researched phenomenon. The case-based empirical analysis presented here 
could be expanded by including more SOEs in alternative sectors. Scholars could, for 
instance, identify moments of market and political change and examine how different 
SOEs react to those changes, as a function of their governance profile and the 
institutional environment of their home country. We hope that our Article will help 
spark more research to improve our understanding of why mixed corporations exist and 
in which conditions they can become efficient organizational forms. 
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